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M s . Mar y "I '. Noonan
Clerk, Utah Court of Appeals
400 Midtown Plaza
230 S. 500 E.
Salt Lake City, Utah 84 102

Dear M s . Noonan:
I am writii lg pursuant to Rule 24(j) . Utah Rul es of
Appellate Procedure, to advise you of the recent decision of .
the court of appeals in Moon v. Moon, 790 P.2d 52 (Utah App.
1 9 9 0 ) . The court held in Moon that the right to make future
castings rf hronzes that were sculpted by the husband during
the parties marriage was a marital asset: subject to equitable
division in their divorce proceeding, even though the economic
benefits of that right would only be realized, in the future.
79 0 v ~ d ;:- • 5 8 5 7
P c o p y o f t h a t d e c i s i o n i s a 11 a c hed,
The Moon decision is pertinent and significant to the
pending appeal in Dunn v. Dunn, Case No, 880611-CA, from the
district court's ruling that the right to fixed royalty
payments under a 1icense agreement for surgical instruments
that were designed by the husband and marketed under the
license agreement during the marriage was the separate property
of the husband and was not subject to equitable division in the
parties 1 divorce. The Dunn appeal was argued on March 2, 1990
before Judges Bi llings, Garff and Orme, The- issues raised by
the d i s t r i c t c o u r t" s t r e a tme n t o f 1: h e r :i g 1 11 t o r o y a 11 i e s u n d e r

Ms. Mary T. Noonan
June 18, 1990
Page 2

the license agreement
argument and at pages
Appellant, pages 9 to
Respondent, and pages

were specifically addressed in oral
9 to 11 and 23 to 24 of the Brief of
11 and 22 to 25 of the Brief of
3 to 5 and 10 to 16 of the Reply Brief
Very truly yours,

[/fit^AS^iJ- 0
Patricia A. O'Rorke
PAO:bh
Enclosure
cc:

Clark W. Sessions and
Dean C. Andreason with enclosure

51870
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Susan MOON, Plaintiff; Appellant, n^d
Cross-Respondent,
r.
Gary MOON, Defendant and
Respondent

benefits of keeping siblings together, enabling sibling bonds to form; character and
emotional stability of custodian; desire for
custody; and apparent commitment of prt&
posed custodian to parenting.

2. Divorce <*=»299
Trial court did not abuse its discretion
Susan MOON, Plaintiff; Respondent,
in
awarding
custody of children to father
and Cross-Appellant,
and awarding mother extensive visitation^
v.
both parents were well qualified for custom
Gary MOON, Defendant and Appellant dy, but father offered more stability and
more flexibility to arrange his time to care
Nos. 890051-CA, 890061-CA.
for children, custody with him accorded
Court of Appeals of Utah.
with oldest child's preference, and while
March 19, 1990.
mother was more able to assist oldest child,
who suffered attention deficit disorder, in
some academic respects, father was better
In divorce action, the Fourth Distt^ able to teach child to work with his hands,
Court, Wasatch County, Boyd L. Park, j ^ to reinforce child's confidence, and to instill
awarded custody of children to fati^. love of nature.
awarded mother extensive visitation, diyjy.
ed property and declined to require wife to 3. Divorce <&=*306
pay child support Husband and wife ^~
Trial court did not abuse its discretion^
pealed. The Court of Appeals, John F ^ . in refusing to require noncustodial parent
Larson, Senior Juvenile Judge, held th^ t to pay child support in light of extensive
(1) trial court did not abuse its discretion ^ visitation awarded to her; trial court in;
awarding custody of children to father a^j tended that children divide their time
awarding mother extensive visitation; ^) roughly equally between their parents and
trial court did not abuse its discretion -m
noncustodial parent, therefore, continued
refusing to require mother to pay ch^j
to bear burden of providing for children
support in light of extensive visitat^Q
that was roughly equal to that of custodial^
awarded to her; (3) trial court prope^y
parent U.OA.1953, 78-45-3, 78-45-4, 7%
held parties9 home to be marital asset si^.
45^-7(2),
ject to equitable division, with except*^
of value of land given to husband by \^ 4. Divorce «=>252.2
parents; and (4) husband's rights in \^
Appropriate considerations in dividing^
sculptures were propertv subject to w property between divorcing parties indudeL
uitable division.
amount and kind of property to be divided^
AJ&2BG&
source of-property, parties'health, r—~l
standard of living and respective finanaa
conditions, their needs and earning
1. Parent and Child *=>2(&3, 3.4, ZJ&, 3. fi)
ties, duration of marriage and relations^
Factors to consider in determinu^ of property to amount of alimony a
"best interests" of child for custody pt^ U.CJL1953, 30-3-5(1).
poses include: need for stability in custoqj.
al relationship and environment; maintai^ 5. Divorce «=>252.5<1)
ing existing primary custodial bond; rela.
Trial court properly held divorcing p&j
tive strength of parental bonds; relative ties' home to be marital asset subjefet&lf
abilities of parents to provide care, supers equitable division, with exception of vaHS
skm, and suitable environment for chfldr^ of land given to husband by his parent?
and to meet needs of children; preferen^ while husband may once have had separata
of child able to evaluate custody question^. obligation for home financing, that obB
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gation was fully discharged with marital
funds. U.CJU953, 30-3-5(1).
S. Divorce *»25&3(1)
Divorcing husband's rights in his
sculptures were property subject to equitable division even though economic benefits would be realized in future; it was
sufficient that right to reproduce creative
rvork was capable of being validly assigned
n present U.C.A.1953, 30-3-5.
r. Divorce «=»252L3<1)
Right that is fully identifiable and
ransferrable can be divided as marital
>roperty, even though its full economic
yenefits may be realized, if at all, only in
xiture. U.CA.1953, 30-3-5.
John Walsh (argued), Salt Lake City, for
>usan Moon.
David S. Dolowitz (argued) and M. Joy
)ouglas, Salt Lake City, for Gary Moon.
Before BENCH, GARFF and
ARSON1, JJ.
OPINION
JOHN FARR LARSOtt, Senior
uvenile Judge:
Susan Moon appeals from the custody
ward, and Gary Moon cross-appeals from
le visitation award and the property diviton of their decree of divorce. Gary Moon
Iso appeals from the denial of child suport from Susan. We affirm.
The parties were married in 1973. Shortr
thereafter, they settled in rural Wasatch
ounty, where Gary Moon had been buildig a home on land given him by his parits. He had borrowed $21,000 to pay for
taterials and labor, a debt that was paid
T in 1979. The home was fully completed
id enlarged during the marriage. The
ridence conflicts concerning the value of
ie home, and valuation based on original
«t was difficult because the parties often
irtered for needed materials.
John Fair Larson, Senior Juvenile Judge, sitting by special appointment pursuant to Utah

Gary Moon is a self-employed sculptor.
He determines the amount of work lie does
and the amount of income he makes, and
his work output and income have fluctuated considerably. Some evidence indicated
that when marital difficulties arose, Gary
Moon intentionally decreased the amount
of his work and thereby precipitated a financial crisis in the family. In order to
meet necessary household expenses at that
time, Susan Moon took clerical employment
in Park City, Utah, whOe Gary Moon remained at home, where he had an art
studio. Susan Moon is still thus employed.
The Moons have three children ages 14,
8, and 6. Both parents have close and
loving relationships with their children.
The trial court found that remaining with
their father would present less disruption
for the children than a shift to maternal
custody, and remaining in their present
home would enable them to continue relationships with their nearby extended family. There were some indications that Susan Moon may be inclined to leave the
Wasatch County area, in order to improve
her education and employment prospects.
The parties' oldest son, Jeral, expressed a
desire to live with his father, and the other
two children wanted to remain with their
brother.
Jeral has a psychophysiological ailment
known as attention deficit disorder, which
makes learning difficult for him, particularly in the subjects of reading and mathematics. Both parents have worked with Jeral
to ameliorate his problems. Susan Moon's
efforts have focused mainly on reading,
mathematics, medical treatment, and Jeral's social needs, whOe Gary Moon has
helped Jeral to work with his hands, to
have confidence, and to appreciate nature
and his family.
Two mental health experts testified at
trial and expressed sharply conflicting
opinions regarding prospective custody of
the children. Dr. Elizabeth Stewart, a clinical psychologist appointed by the court to
perform a custody evaluation, noted that
Code Ann. § 7^-3-24(10) (Supp.1989).
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each parent was a fit and proper person to interests" criterion to include the following
have custody of the children but, since a factors:2
choice was necessary, she recommend^
The need for stability in custodial rela<fat tie &<&erfareeastx??. 3r. W.&s^n
tionship and environment; maintaining
Belnap, a pediatric psychiatrist who h^j
an existing primary custodial bond; the
treated Jeral for over three years, came ^
relative strength of parental bonds,1
precisely the opposite conclusion and r ^
The relative abilities of the parents to
ommended that Susan Moon have custo$w
provide care, supervision, and a suitable
The district court resolved the custody
environment for the children and to meet
dilemma in this case by placing all of t ^
the needs of the children;4
children in the custody of Gary Moon, w ^
Preference of a child able to evaluate the
extensive, specified visitation by S u s ^
custody question;1
No child support was awarded Occupaw
The benefits of keeping siblings togethof the home was awarded to Gary, s u b j ^
er, enabling sibling bonds to form;'
to certain conditions, and the equity in t^e
The character and emotional stability of
home, less the value of the land gifted ^
Gary, was to be divided equally betw^ n
the custodian;7 and
the parties upon an eventual sale of t ^
The desire for custody; the apparent
home. The rights to Gary's artistic wo*^
commitment of the proposed custodian to
created during the marriage were also <jj_
parenting.8
vided between the parties.
These factors are highfy persona) and
On appeal, Susan Moon argues mainu individual, and do not lend themselves to
against the trial court's award of custody the means of generalization employed in
to Gary Moon. In his cross-appeal, Ga^L other areas of the law, such as quantifies
challenges the visitation, the lade of chi^ tkm in money. As an appellate court, we
support, and the property division. fye are limited in our institutional ability to
address first the custody and visitation ^ come to grips with these considerations,
sues, then turn to consideration of t ^ whereas the trial court is in a much bettei
property division.
position to gain the necessary understanding to make the best decision possible
Custody and Visitation
under the circumstances. Therefore, ourr
[1] Statute requires that a court d e t ^ review of the trial court's assessment of.
mining custody consider "the best interes^ these factors is limited, and "we accord
of the child and the past conduct and de*^ broad discretion to the trial court so that it
onstrated moral standards of each of t ^ mxj ^ ^ first-hand proximity to tne
parties." Utah Code Ami. § 80-8-\ 0 parties to resolve the delicate and highh
(1989). Case law has fleshed out the ~
personal problems presented in custody cus2. This list is not exhaustive, and in making u
merated set of concepts. See SchbuBer v. Schb
dkr, TI6 P.2d 84 (Utah App.1989).
*~
3. Davis v. Davis, 749 PJ2A 647, 648-49 (Ufa.
1988); Hirsch v. Hirsch, 725 P.2d 1320 (Otaf
1986); Pusey v. Pusey, 728 PJ2d 117, 120 (Ota?
1986); Hutchison v. Hutchison, 649 P.2d 38. &
(Utah 1982); Nielsen v. Nielsen, 620 ?2d 51,
512 (Utah 1980); Ptayzek v. Paryzek, 776 P.2d 7J
(Utah App.1989); Myers v. Myers, 768 ?2d 97<°
983 (Utah App.1989).
4. Watt K WaH 700 P.2d 1124 (Utah 198% EL
win K Erwin, 773 P.2d 847, 849 (Utah ApC
1989); De&en v. Deehen, 772 P.2d 972, 97*
(Utah App.1989); Myers v. Myers, 768 ?2d £
983.
^

5. Henderson v. Henderson, 576 ?2d 1289 (Utah
1978X
6L Jorgensen v. Jbrgensen, 599 P.2d 510. 512-5$
(Utah 1979) (Crockett, CJ„ concurring special
lyfc Webonv.Coffman, 110 Utah U 169 ?2d§l
(1946).
7. See generally Utah Code Ann. § 33-3-10°
(1989); Sanderson v. Tryon, 739 ?2d 623 (Utah4
1987); Hutchison v. Hutchison, 649 P2d at^41)$
Kotlas K Ratios, 614 ?2d 641 (Utah 1980). ^
8. State ex reL R— L—> 17 Utah 2d 349, 41
P.2d839(1966k Walton* Cdffman, 110Ut
169 P2d 97 (1946).
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putes." Erwin v. Erwin, 773 P.2d 847,849
(Utah App.1989) (footnote omitted); see
also Nutter v. Nutter, 688 P.2d 454, 455
(Utah 1984).
[2] In the instant case, the trial court
carefully considered the foregoing factors
and the best interests of the children. The
choice was a difficult and apparently dose
one, but we find in it no abuse of discretion. Both parents were found to love
their children and to be well qualified for
custody. The primary custodian had in resent months been the father, who was at
home most of the time. In balancing the
competing considerations to determine the
>est interest of the children, the trial court
found that the father offered, among other
liings, more stability than the mother and
nore flexibility to arrange his time to care
or them. Custody with him accorded with
eral's preference, and the younger chilIren wished to remain with JeraL
Jeral poses special considerations in deermining custody because of his attention
leficit disorder. Both parents had worked
nth Jeral to mitigate difficulties associatd with his ailment It is true that Susan
ras more able to assist Jeral in some acaemic respects, but Gary was found to be
lore able to teach Jeral to work with his
ands, to reinforce Jeral's confidence, and
> instill a love of nature. While academic
access is very important, children have
ther needs and potential that should be
iken into consideration, which the trial
>urt appears to have done. The custody
ward to Gary, coupled with the liberal
sitation to Susan, is perhaps an attempt
> provide the children the best of both
orlds and enable them to benefit from the
tmplementary parenting talents of both
ary and Susan.
Susan argues that she is, in effect, being
tnalized for taking employment outside
See generally Pusey v. Pusey, 728 ?2d 117
[Utah 19S6); Marchant v. Merchant, 743 P-2d
199, 204 (Utah App.1987).
Pusey v. Pusey, 728 P.2d at tip.
In particular, the trial court had to weigh the
cstimony of Dr. Stewart and Dr. Belnap, who
lad come to opposing conclusions. The trial
*>urt, in light of all of the circumstances, chose

the home at variance with outmoded views
of gender roles.f However, the trial court
clearly intended no penalty and exhibited
no gender bias. In a choice between two
potential custodians, the effect of either
custodian's employment on the best interests of the children may properly be considered.19 From the perspective of these
children's best interests, there is an advantage to custody with Gary in that he works
where the children reside and has some
scheduling flexibility to accommodate their
needs. That advantage has nothing to do
with gender stereotyping; the same advantage would be realized if Susan were a
self-employed sculptor working at home.
We therefore conclude in relation to custody of the children that the trial court did
not abuse its discretion in awarding custody to Gary Moon. For the reasons we have
noted above, and unless it appears that the
trial court has given short shrift to the
statutory criteria, we accord considerable
discretion to the trial court in making a
custody decision because of its first-hand
proximity to the people involved. The value of that proximity is especially high in
this case, where a choice must be made
between two fine parents based on conflicting evidence.11 Such a choice is difficult,
but we must conclude that Susan has not
demonstrated that the trial court's decision
rises to the level of an abuse of discretion
in granting custody to Gary but awarding
her extensive visitation.
The visitation order is generous, and was
apparently intended to enable the children
to spend roughly equal time with each parent For the reasons noted above in relation to custody,^ and given the parenting
abilities of both parents, the visitation
schedule was not an abuse of the court's
discretion.12
to accept the recommendations of Dr. Stewart,
which is the prerogative of the finder of fact
State v. Lafferty. 749 P.2d 1239, 1245-46 (Utah
1988); Myers v. Myers, 768 ?2d 979, 984 (Utah
1988).
12. It was apparent that the parents were not on
very good terms with each other and that the
frequency of visitation may engender competition between the parents for the love and affec-

56 Utah

790 PACIFIC REPORTER, 2d SERIES

Child Support
[3] Parents have a fundamental duty to
support.their chfldren. Utah,Code AiF*
not shared by the parents in a comn*on
household, a judicial decree allocating tF 8
duty between the parents may be nec^8"
sary, in order to assure the children °*
adequate support without unfairly burd^n"
ing one parent In making that allocate
the court is statutorily directed to considar
(a) the standard of living and situation °*
the parties;
(b) the relative wealth and income of v"e
parties;
(c) tbe ability of the obligor to earn;
(d) the ability of the obligee to ea*11'
(e) the need of the obligee;
(f) the age of the parties;
(g) the responsibility of the obligor >or
the support of others.
Utah Code Ann. 78-45-7 § (2) (1987). Appellate courts have reversed decisions o n
child support where a trial court has f a*^
to follow these statutory mandates.13 S#c"
is not the case here, however.
It is true that the trial court in this c ^ e
awarded no child support to Gary Mo011*
who received custody of the chfldi^nHowever, the court was cognizant that ^e
children would be spending a great a m o ^
of their time in Susan Moon's care, in vi^w
of the extensive visitation awarded to l*er*
As noted above, the trial court intend
that the children divide their time rougw
equally between their parents. Su^f11
Moon therefore continues to bear in realty
a burden of providing for her children tfe**
consideration of the award of the home *°
Gary Moon and of the other facts bearing
on tbe above-fisted statutory factors, tb e r e
tion of these children. Children should be «*".
forded tbe opportunity to live happily in t~
world of each parent Wise parents have ***
best interests of their children at heart and ***
careful not to undermine' the children's *"*
giance to the other parent
13. E*. Stevens v. Stevens, 754 P.2d 952, ^SS
(Utah App.1983); Jefferies v.Jefferies, 752 fM
909, 911 (Utah App.1988). .

is no abuse of discretion in the trial
refusal to award child support fmm
Moon to Gary Moon.
Property Division
[4] Utah Code Ann. § 30-3-5(1^
requires that the property
"equitable," see also Noble v. M
P.2d 1369, 1373 (Utah 1988). Thev
purpose of the property
enable the former spouses to pursSe
separate lives as well as possible.14:
priate considerations "in dividing ^ _ _ ^
include the amount and kind of property^!
be divided, the source of the property;^
parties9 health, the parties' standard of Bvj
ing and respective financial condEtms;
their needs and earning capacities, the <hh
ration of the marriage, and the relationship
the property has with the amount of aftfiiS
ny awarded.16
(5\ TXSL telatiau ta tfc& ^taxjertaj <ttsg3csgk
in this case, Gary Moon argues that*IB|
trial court erred in awarding to Susan!
Moon half the eventual proceeds xrf^^
marital home less an amount attribiKa^
to the value of the gifted land.1* ^ 4 ^ ^
maintains that tbe home was financed^
large part by funds he separately bor
before the marriage. However,
he may once have had a separate obligation
for the home financing, he lias fullyIds*]
charged that obligation with marital funds*)
his home loan was entirely paid off during?
the marriage. Except for the value of the
land given Gary by his parents, the trad]
court properly held the home to be a mark
tal asset subject to equitable division ixpam
divorce.
(&JI Gar^ Moon al&Q chaJOLeiiJj^'theL
award to Susan Moon of the
statues that Gary had sculpted
the right to cast bronzes from
14. Burke v. Burke, 733 ?2d 133. 135 (Utah
19S7); see Smith v. Smith 751 P.2d 1149. \VSt
(Utah App.1988).
15. Naranjo v. tkamjo, 751 PJd 1144. 1147^8
(Utah App.1988).
16. Gary also questions the apportionment OL
value between tbe raw land gifted to him as Ittf
separate property and the improvements ttrfhgj
land. We do not find the trial court's valuation
to be clearly erroneous.

WH1TEH0USE v. WHITEHOUSE

Utah

J

Cite M 799 T2& 57(UtallApp. 1990)

verting that the' right to make future
jstings is not property that can be divided
etween divorcing spouses under section
3-5-5, smce its economic benefits will be
>alized in the future. However, an asset
istributable under section 30-3-5 need not
e readily and immediately convertible into
loney. It is enough that the right to
^produce a creative work is a right capale of being validly assigned in the
resent17 A right that is thus fuDy identiable and transferable can be divided as
larital property, even though its full ecoomic benefits may be realized, if at all,
oly in the future.18 Gary Moon's rights in
is sculptures are therefore property sublet to equitable division in divorce pursunt to section 30-3-5.
In conclusion, the trial court in this case
cted within its discretion in awarding cusxly of the children to Gary Moon with
beral visitation to Susan Moon and withut child support The court also acted
rithin its discretion in dividing the parties9
roperty. This court therefore affirms the
arties* divorce decree in all respects, the
arties to bear their own costs and attorey fees on appeal.
BENCH and GARFF, JJ., concur.
!KEr«UMKtSYSTlM>

Ted Sherill WHITEHOUSE, Plaintiff
and Respondent,
v.
Kathleen Shields WHITEHOUSE.
Defendant and Appellant.
No. 880491-CA.
Court of Appeals of Utah.
March 21, 1990.
In divorce proceeding, former wife appealed from order of the Third District
7. £ £ , Wah Disney Prods, v. Basmajfctn, 600
RSupp. 439 (D.N.Y.. 1984); NUcaCbrp. * City of
Kansas Oty, Mo±S$2 F-Supp. 343 <DJ&xl983X
S. See, e&, Gardner v. Gardner, 74S F2d 1076
(Utah 1983) (business good will); Sorensen v.

Court, Tooele Conner, J. Dennis Frederick,
J., which granted former husband's petition
to modify decree. *Tbe Court of Appeals,
Billings, J., held that (1) original decree
unambiguously gave husband contingent
interest family home and, thus, trial court's
modification of family home equity provisions could not be upheld on theory of
reformation, and (2) trial court's findings
and uncontested evidence concerning
changed circumstances did not support
modification of home equity provisions or
retirement provisions of original divorce decree
Reversed and remanded.

1. Husband and Wife *=»279<1)
Reformation of Instruments €=»16
Original divorce decree, premised on
parties' stipulation, unambiguously gave
husband contingent interest in family home
and, thus, trial court's modification of family home equity provisions could not be upheld on theory of reformation; decree statr
ed that wife was to receive house, "subject
to [husband's] interest in one half of the
equity of said residenceT existing as of the
date of the divorce • * * conditioned upon
[wife] selling said residence or remarrying
within seven and one half yeara • * • , f
2. Divorce *=>254(2)
Deficiency in divorce decree which
failed to provide time for payment of wife's
interest in husband's retirement fund
would justify trial court supplying missing
terms on timing of payment
X Divorce *=>164

uourt nas conunuing jurisdiction to
modify divorce decree, but party requesting that decree be modified must demonstrate that there has been substantial
change of circumstances occurring since
Sorensen, 769 P^d 320, 823-24 (Utah App.
1989)), (good will and receivables); Woodward
v. Woodwud. 656 P.2d43HUtah 1982) (retirement funds).
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Ms. Mary T. Noonan
Clerk, Utah Court o
400 Midtown Plaza
230 South 500 East
Salt Lake City, Utah
Re:

84] 02

Dunn v. Dunn, Case No

880611-CA

Dear Ms. Noonan:
I am writing pursuant to Rule 24(j), Utah Rules of
Appellate Procedure, to advise you of the recent decision of
the court of appeals in Morgan v. Morgan, 137 Utah Adv. Rep. 35
(1990). The Morgan decision is pertinent and significant to
the pending appeal in Dunn v. Dunn, Case No. 880611-CA.
The court held in the Morgan case that marital assets
should be valued as of the time of the divorce decree; it
remanded for additional findings on the valuation of bank
accounts which the trial court had valued on the basis of
pretrial bank statements that did not reflect their value at
the time of trial. 137 Utah Adv. Rep. at 37-38. This ruling
is pertinent to the appeal of the valuation and division of
retirement benefits in the Dunn case, where the benefits
accrued in three separate retirement plans were valued and
divided on the basis of statements that had been prepared in
February, March, and December of 1987, and admittedly did not
reflect the contributions and accruals made between the
statement dates and the May 1988 trial.

Ms, Mary T. Noonan
July 9, 1990
Page Two
The Dunn appeal was argued on March 2, 1990, before
Judges Billings, Garff and Orme. The valuation and division
of the retirement benefits were specifically addressed in oral
argument and at pages 12 to 13 and 25 to 27 of the Brief of
Appellant, pages 11 to 13 and 25 to 28 of the Brief of
Respondent,, and, pages 20 to 22 of the Rep] y Brief,
Very truly yours,

&&t±Jl6,&Jk<~
•

Patricia A
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cc:

Clark W. Sessions and
Dean C. Andreason with enclosure
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I.

INTRODUCTION

The Brief of Respondents urges this court to uphold the
trial court's judgment based upon two premises which are directly
contrary to the established law of Utah governing the division of
property in a divorce.

First, they seek affirmance of the trial

court's holding that a spouse who brings superior earning capacity
into a marriage is entitled to retain the property acquired with
his earnings during the marriage as his separate property.
Second, they argue that there are no standards limiting the extent
to which property acquired with the marital earnings of an
economically talented husband may be disproportionately awarded to
him, even when there are no compensating factors to equalize the
parties' circumstances after the divorce.
are directly contrary to Utah law.

Both of those premises

In this case, they resulted in

substantial and prejudicial error.
None of the property at issue in this appeal was owned at
the time of the marriage or received by gift or inheritance during
the marriage.

It is all property that was acquired during the

marriage with marital income.

Yet, the trial court excluded a

substantial amount of that property from the marital estate.

It

did so on the premise that property acquired during the marriage
through the application of knowledge, skills or expertise which
Dr. Dunn brought to the marriage should be treated as his separate
property.

This dramatic expansion of the definition of separate

property cannot be reconciled with the established law that

-1-

property acquired through the employment of either spouse during
the marriage should be divided equitably.
Focusing exclusively on the economic talents and
contributions of each party, the trial court awarded most of the
economic assets to the spouse who was economically favored with
superior earning ability and separate property.

Its property

division was based on the principle that the parties' post-divorce
living standards should not be equalized.

Its objective was to

return the parties to their disparate standards of living before
the marriage, rather than to continue to the extent possible the
standard of living they enjoyed during their eleven years
together.

Such intentional disproportion in favor of an

economically gifted spouse, when there are no compensating factors
favoring the other spouse, violates the standards established for
the equitable division of property under Utah Code Annotated
§ 30-3-5(1) (Supp. 1988).
This misapplication of Utah law resulted in substantial
and prejudicial inequity.

By treating the most substantial assets

acquired during the marriage as Dr. Dunn's separate property, and
awarding 67 percent of the remainder to Dr. Dunn as well, the
trial court favored him by a four-to-one ratio.

The result was,

as intended, a radical reduction in Mrs. Dunn's financial
resources and standard of living, while Dr. Dunn's economic
circumstances were barely affected by the divorce.

Because the

trial court misapplied Utah law with inequitable and prejudicial
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results, the property distribution should be reversed.

Beraer v.

Beraer, 713 P.2d 695, 697 (Utah 1985).
II.
A.

THE TRIAL COURT MISAPPLIED UTAH LAW.

The Trial Court Misapplied Utah Law By Treating
Assets Acquired As A Result Of Dr. Dunn's
Professional Work Purina The Marriage As His
Separate Property.

By adopting Dr. Dunn's argument that property acquired
through his professional efforts during the marriage should be
treated as his separate property, the trial court misapplied Utah
law.

The pooling of individual knowledge, skills and expertise is

the very essence of marriage, and its economic fruits are marital
assets.

See Savage v. Savage, 658 P.2d 1201 (Utah 1983); Lee v.

Lee, 744 P.2d 1378 (Utah App. 1987).
The Utah supreme court has consistently held that
"[m]arital property 'encompasses all of the assets of every nature
possessed by the parties, whenever obtained and from whatever
source derived. . . .'"
1988) (citation omitted).

Gardner v. Gardner, 748 P.2d 1076 (Utah
The essential criterion which

distinguishes marital property from separate property is "whether
a right to the benefit or asset has accrued in whole or in part
during the marriage."
(Utah 1982);

Woodward v. Woodward, 656 P.2d 431, 432-33

Sorenson v. Sorenson, 102 Utah Adv. Rep. 14, 17-18

(Utah App. 1989).

Even intangible property rights accrued by a

professional spouse's efforts during the marriage are marital
property to be included in the marital estate.

Gardner v.

Gardner, supra; Sorenson v. Sorenson, supra, 102 Utah Adv. Rep. at
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16-18.

See also Lee v. Lee. 744 P.2d 1378, 1380 (Utah App.

1987).
Respondents do not cite a single authority which even
suggests that property attained through one spouse's employment
during a marriage should be treated as that spouse's separate
property.

The cases cited in Respondents' Brief only treat as

separate property assets which one spouse owned at the time of the
marriage or received through gift or inheritance after the
marriage.

See Mortensen v. Mortensen, 760 P.2d 304 (Utah 1988)

(property received through gifts and inheritances); Newmever v.
Newmeyer, 745 P.2d 1276 (Utah 1987) (property received through
inheritance); Burke v. Burke, 733 P.2d 133 (Utah 1987) (property
received through inheritance); Jesperson v. Jesperson, 610 P.2d
326 (Utah 1980) (property owned at time of marriage).
Respondents' reliance on Petersen v. Petersen, 737 P.2d
237 (Utah App. 1987), is also misplaced.

Petersen held that a

medical degree is not in itself marital property subject to
division,,

But it also held that the earning capacity derived from

a medical degree should be considered with the objective of
equalizing the parties' circumstances after the divorce.

Accord

Ravburn v. Rayburn, 738 P.2d 238 (Utah App. 1987).
Mrs. Dunn claims no interest in Dr. Dunn's medical
degree.

But the fact that he earned his degree before the

marriage certainly does not mean that all of the property acquired
with his professional earnings during the marriage are his
separate property.

Were each spouse entitled to retain all of the
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property acquired with his earnings during the marriage, the
statutory policy of dividing property equitably between employed
and unemployed spouses would be completely obviated.

Utah Code

Ann. § 30-3-5(1) (Supp. 1988).
B.

The Trial Court Misapplied Utah Law By Making
A Severely Disproportionate Property Division
In Favor Of Dr. Dunn, When There Were No
Compensating Economic Factors Favoring Mrs.
Dunn, On The Ground That Mrs. Dunn Had Enioved
A Standard Of Living Bevond Her Own Earning
Capacity During The Marriage.

The trial court considered Dr. Dunn's superior earning
ability and substantial premarital property

reason to award him

most of the property acquired during the marriage.

With the

objective of dividing the property unequally to reflect the
parties* differing standards of living before the marriage, the
trial court first excluded over $494,000 worth of property
acquired during the marriage as "separate propertyH of Dr.
2
Dunn, and then awarded two-thirds of the remaining property to

1

This includes a ranch with a net equity of $245,000,
as well as the valuable good will and accounts receivable of
his professional corporation, all of which were determined to
be premarital assets.
2

This includes the interest in the December 1, 1985
License Agreement worth $232,572; the hard assets of the
professional corporation worth $115,845, contributions to Dr.
Dunn's retirement plans between February 1987 and the time of
trial, the value of which is unknown; $90,908 worth of
retirement benefits accrued during the marriage but attributed
to accruals on premarital contributions; and credits of $55,093
against a jointly held promissory note acquired in 1984, an
airplane purchased in 1983, and two automobiles purchased in
1983 and 1986.
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him as well.

Although Mrs. Dunn had no separate assets or

income, received only three years' alimony, and was required to
pay her own attorney fees, she was awarded less than 24 percent of
the marital estate.

This cannot be reconciled with the standards

established by the Utah supreme court and this court for the
equitable division of property under Section 30-3-5(1).
There is no dispute about the facts.
children, and Dr. Dunn refused to adopt any.

The parties had no
Mrs. Dunn quit her

job in 1979, and thereafter devoted all of her efforts to
non-income producing activities.

She assumed all of the

responsibility for maintaining the home, preparing the meals,
attending to the parties' financial accounts and investments, and
all the other normal duties of a housewife.

In addition, she

performed clerical and bookkeeping services for the professional
corporation, entertained Dr. Dunn's professional associates, and
traveled with Dr. Dunn to professional meetings.

Those supportive

activities left Dr. Dunn free to devote all of his time to his
ongoing career, but produced no separate income.

Testimony of Dr.

Dunn, R000240 at 9-19; Testimony of Mrs. Dunn, R000242 at 113-120;
Brief of Respondents at 6-7.
The trial court discounted those non-income producing
activities.

Focusing on Dr. Dunn's professional relationships,

3

Appellant calculates the award of the remaining
property as 67 percent - 33 percent, while Respondents
calculate it as 62 percent - 38 percent. See Appendix 1 to
Brief of Appellant and Appendix 1 to Brief of Respondents.
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rather than the marital relationship between the parties, it found
that Mrs. Dunn's efforts had not been -required- for Dr. Dunn's
success.

But Mrs. Dunn was the doctor's wife, not his business

partner.

Whether or not it mattered to his professional

colleagues that she traveled with him to meetings and supported
his career, it mattered to him.

It is undisputed that Dr. Dunn

expected Mrs. Dunn to travel with him to meetings and to perform
the other domestic, clerical and social duties she assumed during
the marriage.

Her efforts to meet those expectations were an

essential part of their marital contract.

R000242 at 122, 162,

184; R000240 at 9-19.
The Supreme Court of Utah and this court have
consistently held that, whether both parties are employed or one
spouse works while the other performs a supportive role, the
overriding objective of a trial court in dividing marital assets
is to to allow both parties to continue the standard of living
they enjoyed during the marriage to the extent possible.

Gardner

v. Gardner, supra, 748 P.2d at 1078; Rasband v. Rasband, 752 P.2d
1331, 1333 (Utah App. 1988).

Otherwise, the contributions made by

a nonprofessional spouse to the success of a professional spouse
would be ignored, a result which has never been allowed under Utah
law.

Sorenson v. Sorenson, 102 Utah Adv. Rep. 14 at 18.
To be sure, the division of property need not be

mathematically equal, but equality —
objective.

not disequality —

is the

E.g., Mortensen v. Mortensen, 760 P.2d 304 (Utah

1988); Sorenson v. Sorenson, supra, 109 Utah. Adv. Rep. at 20.

-7-

The only time an intentional disproportion in the division of
property has been allowed in recent cases is when the
disproportionate award compensated for other economic factors in
order to make the overall effect of the divorce decree equitable
to both parties.

In the absence of compensating factors tending

to equalize the imbalance, disproportionate distributions of
property have consistently been reversed.

E.g., Gardner v.

Gardner, supra.
The cases cited in the Brief of Respondents reflect tnose
established standards.

In Petersen v. Petersen, supra, this court

held that the husband's medical degree was not marital property,
but it approved the trial court's effort to divide the marital
property equally.
Savage, supra.

I£., 737 P.2d at 242-43, citing Savage v.

In Berger v. Berger, 713 P.2d 695 (Utah 1985), the

Utah supreme court reversed the trial court's judgment because,
like the judgment in this case, it was based on distorted
valuations which resulted in one spouse receiving less than 40
percent of the marital estate.
The only cases cited by Respondents which support their
position are old opinions which do not reflect the current law of
Utah.

For example, Cox v. Cox, 532 P.2d 994 (Utah 1975), decided

14 years ago, approved the old "rule of thumb" by which one-third
of the marital assets were awarded to the wife and two-thirds were
awarded to the husband.

!£., 532 P.2d at 997.

No recent Utah

cases have referred to such a "rule of thumb" as an appropriate
basis for dividing marital property in a divorce.

MacDonald v.

MacDonald, 120 Utah 573, 236 P.2d 1066 (1951), decided 38 years
-8-

ago, held that when a wife was found -guilty of habitual
drunkenness,M her fault was not to be disregarded in determining
4
her rights to marital property.
That is also contrary to
current Utah law.

E.g., Jesperson v. Jesperson, supra.

Other cases cited by the Respondents involved equitable
factors weighing against the party who was disfavored in the
property division.

For example, in Jesperson v. Jesperson, 610

P.2d 326 (Utah 1980), the wife was 68 years old and had limited
assets at the time of the marriage, while the husband was 73 and
had no assets.

The marriage lasted only five years, during which

the husband was guilty of constant misconduct, and after which he
claimed that his elderly wife had given him her pre-marital
property.

In Whisoell v. Whispell, 534 N.Y.S.2d 557 (App. Div. 3d

Dept. 1988), the court upheld a disproportionate property division
on the basis of the husband's -sporadic employment, indolence,
immoderate drinking, and generally negative contribution to the
marriage,- and his -threats to make things difficult for [the
wife's] son[.]M

Id., 534 N.Y.S.2d at 558.

In this case, there

were no such equitable factors weighing against Mrs. Dunn.

To the

contrary, having been abandoned by her husband without fault on
her part and without any separate assets or significant earning
capacity, all equities weighed in her favor.

4

In addition, the wife in MacDonald had received one
inheritance and was expected to receive another. Nevertheless,
she was awarded a larger share of the total marital assets than
the husband. Id., 236 P.2d at 1070.
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III.

THE TRIAL COURT'S MISAPPLICATION OF THE LAW
RESULTED IN A MANIFEST INEQUITY.

The trial court not only excluded from the marital estate
the entire value of the December 1, 1985 License Agreement, the
hard assets of the professional corporation, and a substantial
portion of the retirement benefits accrued during the marriage, it
also awarded 67 percent of the remaining marital assets to Dr.
Dunn.

Because there were no compensating factors favoring Mrs.

Dunn, the overall effect of the exclusions, credits and awards of
property in favor of Dr. Dunn resulted in a manifest inequity.
A.

It Was Error To Exclude The Entire Value Of The
December 1, 1985 License Agreement From The
Marital Estate*

Respondents concede that marital property includes
royalty rights on inventions derived from the creative efforts,
time and skill of either spouse during the marriage.

Worth v.

Worth, 195 Cal. App. 3d 768, 241 Cal. Rptr. 135 (Cal. App. 1 Dist.
1987); Wilkins v. Stout, 588 P.2d 145 (Utah 1978); Brief of
Respondents at 22.

They also concede that Dr. Dunn's right to

royalties under the December 1, 1985 License Agreement derived
from his efforts, time and skill in designing the surgical
instruments

during his marriage to Mrs. Dunn.

Respondents at 5.

Brief of

Given these admissions, it is clear that the

royalty rights should not have been treated as his separate
property.
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1*

The License Agreement Is Unambiguous And
Does Not Reguire Personal Services.

Manifestly, the License Agreement gives Dr. Dunn the
right to fixed royalties of $50,000 in 1986, $62,500 in 1987,
$75,000 in 1988, $87,500 in 1989, and $100,000 in 1990, as
consideration for a license to use the surgical instruments.

The

only conditions to payment are that Zimmer continue the
instruments in its product line and maintain sales of the
Miller-Galante knee at a certain level.

Trial Exhibit P-4, §§ III

and IV.
Respondents admit that there is absolutely no requirement
in the License Agreement that Dr. Dunn perform any services to
receive the royalty payments.

Brief of Respondents at 10.

But

they urge this court to affirm the trial court's decision to
exclude the entire value of the License Agreement from the marital
estate, based upon Dr. Dunn's uncorroborated testimony that he
traveled approximately 21 days during the preceding year in
connection with promotional services for the surgical
instruments.

R000240 at 43-44.

This violates the basic tenets of

contract law.
The basic rule of contract interpretation is that, in
order to preserve the sanctity of written instruments, the intent
of the parties is to be ascertained from the content of the
instrument itself.

Utah Valley Bank v. Tanner, 636 P.2d 1060,

1061 (Utah 1981) . When the plain language of the contract is
unambiguous, parol evidence cannot be considered to give it a
different meaning.

As the Utah supreme court emphasized in
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Ephraim Theatre Co. v. Hawk, 321 P.2d 221, 223 (Utah 1958), H[i]t
would defeat the very purpose of formal contracts to permit a
party

to invoke the use of words or conduct inconsistent with its

terms to prove that the parties did not mean what they said, or to
use such inconsistent words or conduct to demonstrate uncertainty
or ambiguity where none would otherwise exist.M

Once the parties

have reduced to writing what appears to be a complete and certain
agreement, it is presumed to be their entire agreement, and parol
evidence is not admissible for the purpose of varying or adding to
the terms of the written document.

Rainford v. Rytting, 451 P.2d

769, 770-71 (Utah 1969).
Respondents argue that the unambiguous terms of the
License Agreement were properly disregarded, based upon EIE v. St.
Benedict's Hospital, 638 P.2d 1190 (Utah 1981).

But EIE states

that an apparently complete and certain agreement will be
conclusively presumed to contain the whole agreement and parol
evidence will not be received to vary or add to its terms. 638
P.2d at 1194.

EIE varied this rule only because the agreement in

question was not integrated.

I£.

Because the License Agreement

in this case contains an integration clause, EIE is not
applicable.
This court may read and interpret the License Agreement
for itself.
223.

Ephraim Theatre Company v. Hawk, supra, 321 P.2d at

It plainly does not require personal services as a condition

to payment, and it was error for the trial court to find otherwise.
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2.

Even If Some Personal Services Were
Required, The Royalty Interest Would
Still Be Marital Property.

The Brief of Respondents fails to cite a single authority
which even suggests that a royalty interest which accrued during a
marriage should be treated as separate property if the creator
spouse performs some promotional services in connection with it.
To the contrary, Respondents concede that Wilkins v. Stout, supra,
and Worth v. Worth, supra, correctly state the applicable law.
Brief of Respondents at 22.

Both of those cases establish that a

royalty interest accrued during a marriage is marital property,
even if continuing services on the part of the creator spouse are
expressly required under the terms of the license.
In Wilkins. the husband was an author who had written a
number of textbooks during the marriage.

The wife had assisted

with some clerical functions, but had not written any part of the
books.

The husband's royalty contract with his publisher

expressly required him to revise the books every three years.
Despite this express requirement of continuing services, the
Supreme Court of Utah affirmed the trial court's holding that the
entire royalty interest in all of the books published during the
marriage had properly been included in the marital estate.

Id.

In Worth, the California court similarly held that, like any other
property interest, a copyright interest based upon an artistic
work created during the marriage is marital property.
Cal. Rptr. at 137.

Id., 241

See also Howes v. Howes, 436 So.2d 689 (La.

App. 4 Cir. 1983), cert, denied, 441 So.2d 216 (La. 1983) (license
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for use of invention which the husband developed and patented
during the marriage held to be marital property).
The Respondents' reliance on Woodward v. Woodward, 656
P.2d 431 (Utah 1982), is misplaced.

Woodward held unambiguously

that a property interest accrued during a marriage must be
included in the marital estate, even if its benefits will not be
received until one spouse performs continued services after the
divorce.
"'The right to receive monies in the future is
unquestionably . . . an economic resource*
subject to equitable distribution based upon
proper computation of its present dollar value.H
Whether that resource is subject to distribution
does not turn on whether the spouse can presently
use or control it, or on whether the resource can
be given a present dollar value. The essential
criterion is whether a right to the benefit or
asset has accrued in whole or in part during the
marriage. To the extent that the right has so
accrued, it is subject to equitable distribution.
Id., 656 P.2d at 432-33 (emphasis in original, citations
omitted).

This court applied the same principle in the Sorenson

case, holding that the good will of a professional corporation is
marital property even though it is an intangible interest based
upon an expectation of continuing services.

I£. / 102 Utah Adv.

Rep. at 16-18.
Thus, it was clear error to exclude the entire value of
the License Agreement without valuation, based upon Dr. Dunn's
testimony that he performed some promotional services in
connection with the surgical instruments.

This is the fourth yer

of the five-year Agreement in which the fixed payments have been
made under the unambiguous contract language.
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Dr. Dunn's

occasional attendance at a Zimmer workshop will not change the
character of the royalty interest accrued during the marriage from
marital to separate property.
3.

A Royalty Interest Accrued During The
Marriage Is Marital Property Regardless Of
When The Underlying Knowledge And Skills
Were Acquired.

Respondents assert that the interest in the License
Agreement was properly excluded from the marital estate because
Dr. Dunn had acquired most of the knowledge, skill and expertise
needed to design the surgical instruments before he married Mrs.
Dunn.

See Brief of Respondents at 22.

But the issue is not when

he acquired the knowledge, skill or expertise —

it is whether the

invention was derived from the application of that knowledge,
skill and expertise during the marriage, which is admittedly the
case here.
There is no statutory exception for creative spouses
under Section 30-3-5(1), and none has ever been implied by the
Utah courts.

Whatever knowledge, skill or expertise a person

brings into a marriage, he takes with him.

But property right

accrued during marriage by the application of his talents are
subject to equitable division under Section 30-3-5(1).

Wilkins v.

Stout, supra.
It makes no difference that Mrs. Dunn did not participate
in the design of the surgical instruments.

As the court stated in

Worth v. Worth, supra, -joint or qualitatively equal spousal
efforts or contributions in acquiring the property" are not
required for the property to be considered marital; Mit is enough
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that the skill and effort of one spouse during the marriage
resulted in the creation or acquisition of a property interest."
Id., 241 Cal. Rptr. at 136-137.

Thus, it was error to exclude Dr.

Dunn's interest in the License Agreement from the marital estate
without calculation.

Gardner v. Gardner, supra.

B.

The Hard Assets Of The Professional Corporation
Were Acquired During The Marriage And Should Be
Included In The Marital Estate.

1.

The Assets In Question Were Clearly
Acquired During The Marriage.

Dr. Dunn's accountant, Keith Barnett, valued the hard
assets of the professional corporation at $115,845 as of March 31,
1988.

This included $79,000 in the corporation's bank account, a

$53,224 receivable from Dr. Dunn, and $13,935 for the book value
of artwork and furnishings, less $30,314 in current liabilities.
R000241 at 63-67.

All of those items were accrued during the

marriage.
The cash in the bank account was obviously acquired
during the marriage; the corporation's March 31, 1987 financial
statement reflected only $9,282 in the account as of that date.
Trial Exhibit P-3.

The $53,224 receivable from Dr. Dunn was based

on advances he had taken from the corporation as loans rather than
income.

The trial court treated the receivable as a marital

obligation of Dr. Dunn.

The March 31, 1987 financial statement

reflected the receivable at only $21,081, indicating that more
than half those advances were taken in the year preceding the
trial.

Trial Exhibit P-3.

Moreover, the trial court treated the

corresponding payable as a marital obligation.
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R000221.

The

artwork and furnishings were purchased for the corporation's
office in the home the parties built in 1984, R000241 at 33,

5

and the corporate tax returns reflect that no depreciable
furnishings were acquired before 1981.

Trial Exhibit P-l.

current liabilities were paid before the trial.

The

R000241 at 64.

Based entirely on these Hhard assets" acquired during the
marriage, Mr. Barnett testified that he would advise another
physician to pay Dr. Dunn $115,845 for his medical practice.
R000241 at 67.

It was error for the trial court to exclude them

from the marital estate without valuation.

Gardner v. Gardner,

supra.
2.

There Is No Evidence Whatsoever In The
Record To Support The Exclusion Of The
Corporation's "Hard Assets" As Separate
Property Of Dr. Dunn.

No evidence was ever produced or offered concerning any
hard assets which Dr. Dunn might have had in his medical practice
at the time of the parties' marriage in 1977.

See R000240 at 25.

Dr. Dunn testified about the approximate value of his accounts
receivable before the marriage, but accounts receivable were not
included in Mr. Barnett's valuation.

R000241 at 65-66.

He also

testified about his billing rates before the marriage, but at most
those billing rates only relate to the good will value of the
practice, which was not included in Mr. Barnett's valuation
either.

R000241 at 29-30, and 39-41.

s
The book value of the artwork and furnishings was
$41,912 only one year before the trial. Trial Exhibit P-3.
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The Brief of Respondents asserts that Mrs. Dunn's expert,
Blaine Nelson, valued Dr. Dunn's practice before the marriage in a
manner that supports the trial court's ruling.

That is not so.

Mr. Nelson did value Dr. Dunn's practice at the time of the
marriage and the time of trial, but his valuation was based upon a
capitalization of Dr. Dunn's medical income.

Mr. Nelson concluded

that the value of the practice had increased by $377,831 during
the marriage, from $135,706 as of December 31, 1977, to $513,537
as of March 31, 1988.

R000240 at 21, 22-34, Trial Exhibit P-17.

Based upon Mr. Nelson's testimony, the value of the practice to be
included in the marital estate was $377,931, not $0.

The good

will value he attributed to the practice at the time of the
marriage cannot be used to reduce the value of hard assets
acquired during the marriage.

Thus, there was no evidence to

support the treatment of those hard assets as separate property of
Dr. Dunn.
3.

The Trial Court's Exclusion Of The
Corporation's Hard Assets Cannot Be
Reconciled With The Governing Case Law.

The trial court made no attempt to value Dr. Dunn's
practice.

It excluded all of the assets of the professional

corporation from the marital estate as separate property because
Dr. Dunn had a medical practice before the marriage.

Under the

supreme court's opinion in Gardner v. Gardner, supra, this was
plain error.
This court's recent opinion in Sorenson v. Sorenson,
supra, establishes that even intangible assets of a professional
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practice should be valued by the trial court.

Like Dr. Dunn's

medical practice, the dental practice in Sorenson had been
established well before the marriage.

But unlike this case, the

trial court in Sorenson valued all of the assets of that practice,
making a prorata adjustment for its premarital value and awarding
offsetting property of equal value to the wife.

In upholding the

trial court's valuation, this court rejected the husband's
argument that the good will and accounts receivable flowing from
his individual talents should not be treated as marital assets.
Id., 102 Utah Adv. Rep. at 18.
The same policy was applied in Lee v. Lee, 744 P.2d 1378
(Utah App. 1987), which reversed the exclusion of the husband's
interest in a business from the marital estate without valuation.
The Brief of Respondents seeks to distinguish Lee on the ground
that the business in that case was established after the parties'
marriage.

But that does not distinguish it from Dr. Dunn's

professional corporation, which was also established after the
parties' marriage.

Moreover, Mr. Lee acquired his interest in his

new business with the proceeds of another business interest which
he brought into the marriage.

Like Dr. Dunn, he claimed that the

new business was not a marital asset because it was a continuation
of a premarital enterprise.

This court rejected that argument.

Thus, under the precedents of Gardner, Sorenson and Lee, it was
clear error for the trial court to exclude the hard assets of Dr.
Dunn's professional corporation from the marital estate without
valuation.

-19-

C.

The District Court's Treatment Of Retirement
Benefits Accumulated During The Marriage Had An
Inequitable Effect,

The Utah supreme court and this court have established
that retirement benefits accumulated during a marriage may only be
divided based upon their present value at the time of trial i_f the
trial court makes specific findings of their present value and
provides a method and reasons for an immediate distribution.
Bailey v. Bailev, 745 P.2d 830 (Utah App. 1987); Ravburn v.
Rayburn, 738 P.2d 238 (Utah App. 1987).

If either of those

requirements is not satisfied, the benefits should be divided on
the basis of a fixed percentage, with a formula determining the
benefits accumulated during the marriage.

Woodward v. Woodward,

supra: Marchant v. Marchant, 743 P.2d 199 (Utah App. 1987).

In

this case, a present value analysis was improper because there was
no competent evidence of the value of Dr. Dunn's retirement
benefits at the time of trial, and no provision was made nor
reasons given for any immediate distribution to Mrs. Dunn.
(1)

The Trial Court Made No Provision For Immediate

Distribution To Mrs. Dunn.

The Brief of Respondents assumes that

the trial court provided for immediate distribution to Mrs. Dunn
of the fixed amounts it awarded her.

That is not the case.

In

fact, Mrs. Dunn's motion for clarification of that precise issue
was denied by the trial court.
(2)

R000147, 000161-64, 000203-04.

There Was No Competent Evidence Of The Value Of The

Retirement Benefits At The Time Of Trial.

Respondents do not

dispute that the trial court's analysis of the retirement benefits
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rested on outdated accountings as of February 19, 1987 for the
Shriner's Hospital Plan, March 31, 1987 for the professional
corporation's retirement plan, and
TIAA-CREF Plan.

December 31, 1987 for the

There was no evidence of the value of those

benefits at the time of the May 1988 trial, although additional
contributions had admittedly been made after the dates of the
accountings produced by Dr. Dunn.

R000240 at 55.

Respondents concede that Utah law requires valuations at
the time of trial for a present value analysis.

Nevertheless,

they ask this court to affirm the trial court's valuation without
such evidence based upon the parties purported "stipulation- to
the outdated valuations.

Brief of Respondents at 27.

The parties

did stipulate to the value of Dr. Dunn's retirement benefits as of
February, March and December, 1987, but there was no stipulation
that those amounts constituted competent evidence of their present
value at the time of trial or provided a proper basis for a
present value analysis.

The Stipulation simply recorded the

values reflected in the old accountings.

R000102.

The use of

such outdated information as evidence of present value is
reversible error under Berqer v. Berqer, 713 P.2d 695 (Utah 1985),
and Marchant v. Marchant, supra.
(3)

The Trial Court Overvalued Defendant's Premarital

Interests In His Retirement Funds.

Mrs. Dunn makes no claims to

the $21,573 in the TIAA-CREF Plan and $21,600 in Shriner's
Hospital Plan which Dr. Dunn accrued before their marriage.
the trial court's exclusion of another
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But

$61,896 in the TIAA-CREF

Plan and $29,012 in the Shriner's Hospital Plan which accrued
after the marriage, based on purported accumulations on the
premarital interests, was not based on competent evidence.

Mr.

Barnett testified that he calculated those amounts based upon
hurried telephone calls to clerical employees of the plans.
R000241 at 93-97.

This double hearsay testimony was unsupported

by any corroborating evidence.

In fact, Dr. Dunn admitted that he

had never kept records of his premarital interests or any accruals
on them.

R000240 at 56-57.

Under those circumstances, $90,918 in

benefits accrued during the marriage should not have been treated
as his premarital property.

Teece v. Teece, 715 P.2d 106 Utah

(1986).
(4)

The Overall Division Of Dr. Dunn's Retirement

Benefits Was Inequitable.

At the time of trial, Dr. Dunn had more

than $570,542 accumulated in his three retirement plans;

and

over $527,369 of that amount had been accumulated during the
marriage.

Yet, Mrs. Dunn was awarded only $143,372, or less than

27 percent, of that amount.

Given the lack of any competent

evidence to establish the amounts attributable to premarital and
marital contributions, it was unfair to exclude another $90,918 as
separate property and award Dr. Dunn two-thirds of the remainder.
See Marchant v. Marchant, supra.

6

This includes $244,054 in the professional corporation's
plan as of March 31, 1987, $204,472 in the TIAA-CREF Plan as of
December 31, 1987, and $122,016 in the Shriner's Hospital Plan as
of February 19, 1987. Trial Exhibit D-25.
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D.

The Credits Against The Promissory Note,
Airplane And Automobiles Had An Inequitable
EffQQt.

The trial court granted Dr. Dunn substantial credits
against an airplane, automobiles, and a promissory note which were
acquired during the marriage.

Although the Cessna was purchased

in 1983 and 88 percent of its cost was admittedly paid from
marital income, R000241 at 28-29, Trial Exhibit P-7, the trial
court excluded $26,000 or 88 percent, of its value from the
marital estate.

This $26,000 credit for a premarital airplane was

not based upon any competent evidence of that plane's value at the
time of the marriage.

R000240 at 63-65; R000241 at 89-90; Trial

Exhibits P-7, D-24, D-25.
The trial court also gave Dr. Dunn a net credit of $6,600
against a Porsche purchased by the professional corporation in
1986, and a 1983 Blazer purchased with marital income.

This

credit was based upon a car owned at the time of the marriage,
although there was no competent evidence of its value in 1977, and
Dr. Dunn admitted that he had commingled the proceeds with marital
assets.

R000241 at 58, 88-89, Trial Exhibits D-24, D-25.

Finally, the trial court excluded $22,493 of the value of a
promissory note and trust deed which the parties acquired in 1984,
although those instruments were held in their joint names and the
payments on the note were deposited into their joint account.
R000240 at 59-60; Trial Exhibits D-24, D-25.

By removing another

$55,093 from the marital estate, these credits further exacerbated
the disproportion in the property division.
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Respondents cite Mortensen v. Mortensen, 760 P.2d 304
(Utah 1988), and Newmever v. Newmever, 745 P.2d 1276, 1277 (Utah
1987), to support those credits.

Brief of Respondents at 30.

But

neither of those cases supports their position.
Mortensen established that while separate property should
generally be awarded to the spouse who brings it into the
marriage, that rule does not apply where the property has been
commingled or exchanged or when the acquiring spouse has made a
gift of an interest in that property to the other spouse.
760 P.2d at 307-09.

Id.,

That is precisely what the record reflects

with respect to the promissory note, airplane, and automobiles.
In Newmeyer, there was competent evidence that the wife
had inherited $55,000 to $60,000, which she had invested in the
purchase of the parties' home.

The court credited her with the

amount of the inheritance, but divided the appreciation on the
home equally.

111., 745 P.2d at 1278.

Significantly, the Utah

supreme court upheld that ruling on the ground that the overall
property distribution was equitable:
The overriding consideration is that the ultimate
division be equitable — that property be fairly
divided between the parties, given their
contributions during the marriage and their
circumstances at the time of the divorce.
Id., 745 P.2d at 1278 (citations omitted).

That overriding

consideration was violated in this case.
IV.

CONCLUSION

A trial court's property division will be overturned
"where there has been a misunderstanding or misapplication of
the law resulting in substantial and prejudicial error or where
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there has been such an abuse of discretion that an inequity or
injustice has resulted."
(Utah 1985).

Beraer v. Beraer, 713 P.2d 695/ 697

That is clearly what occurred in this case.

Consequently, the judgment of the district court should be
reversed and the case should be remanded for a redistribution
of the marital estate in accordance with the decision of this
court.
Dated this 31st day of March, 1989.
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